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PUBLIC INVESTMENT F03 PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
A FTUnv OP THE "OLE Or pARASTATALS AS AN ACTOR AND INDICATOR 
OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN KENYA 
By 
F.C. OKUTHE-OYUPI 
A B S T R A C T 
public enterprise is a common feature of many economies 
throughout the Uorld It is a formula that has been applied in 
both Socialist and Capitalist States and is pervasive in Africa. 
The study of the phenomenon in Africa reveals that Public Enter-
prise in not only an instrument of economic Dolicy, it also has set 
social and political goals. The case of African Countries seems 
that after the euphoria of political independence, the exigencies of 
economic independence called for increased" State intervention. n> 
In Kenya thi~ intervention has been motivated by a desire to promote 
; rivate (indigenous mainly and to a lesser extent, other) enterprise. 
The consequences have been the perpetuation and amplification of social 
and regional disparities that were already in existence or incipient at 
independence. 
The paper is divided into two main narts The first nart deals 
with the theoretical and historical origins of State enterprise, as 
well as the definition of the concept. The second nart deals with 




Public Fnter^rir-^ seerts to play a decisive role in the development 
strategy of several African countries, "orever, and this is of no mean 
importance, the proliferation of tb^ phenomenon .leads to think that there 
is a general belief that the promotion of economic growth is too important 
to be left in the hands of the private sector. 
The- promotion of economic progress seems to have surpassed the 
competence of the classic bureaucratic machinery. The concrete response to 
this problematic has been the establishment of public enterprises, autonomous 
or semi-autonomous units with the mandate to operate (at least most of 
them) like commercial organisations serving the interests of the nation 
as expressed by the political leadership. Under these circumstances, 
the crowinr interest that the public enterprise factor arouses amongst 
researchers cannot be overestimated. 
It is in this context that one laments Aver the lack of indepth 
research on public enterprise in Africa given the partial nature of the 
studies carried out until recently. 
In fact the jurists have for a longtime exercised a kind of 
monopoly ( de facto") in this field, reducing the public enterprise to a 
mere juridical instrument of public authorities in the economy. Thus 
they have dwelt mostly on the institutional and legal structures adopted 
by different states 1utablissement public , "soci'et'e d'etat 
soci'et'e nationale, re'gie" etc. in public lav; countries."1 public 
. . 2 corporation, limited liability company etc. in common law countries." 
1. See mainly Les Societies D^Economice Mixte Dans ^ 
pays en voie deDevelopment• A partir de L'Exemple Malgache. Paris: 
Li.brarie <"ener?le de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1970, and Dutheil de la 
Pochere J. L'Ftat et le Development en Cote D'lvoire. Paris: Pedone, 1974. 
2. r0r exemple KATENDE J, et al. (editors) - The Law of Business 
Organizations in fast and Central Africa. vairobi/Kampala/Dar-es-Salaam-
East African Literature Bureau, 1976- fpikdmann. N.G, GARNER J.f. (eds). 
Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study. New York- Cambridge University 
':ress, 1970. ~ " 
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Since the jurist is always fascinated by the frame and the 
structure, the purely legalistic apnroach has tended to limit the 
scope of study to a mere description of lerral and institutional 
dispositions- This approach is certainly insufficient for two reasons. 
First, the contusion of leral texts and the reality can lead to erroneous 
conclusions: the ideal and the concrete are not always the same. Secondly, 
and more important, legal dispositions constitute part of a whole ideological 
framework that incarnate the wishes o^ the political class. 
Even the purely economic approach, despite its stimulating aspects, 
still is, in my opinion, insufficient. Such a study does not .indicate the 
political and social stake of public enterprises. Defining for example, the 
public enterprise phenomenon simply as 'a stage in the attempt to modernise 
3 . the economy'' does not tell us the objectives, the goals and the interests 
of the actors in this "modernization' exercise. 
More recent studies manifest a certain evolution in posing the 
real problem1 Why the omnipresence of public enterprise on a Continent 
so rich in conflicting idec^ Losri es. The question that one should ask is 
whether it is a fashion,or model on a conjunctural imperative. 
It is in trying to answer this ouestion that we realise that 
public enterprise is not only a juridical entity or just an economic 
unit but that its very existence is intricately linked to the socio-
economic environmeri". It must thus be treated as part of an ensemble. 
As recent works show, the study of the public enterprise provideds a 
unioue and privileged opportunity to observe the array of political 
and economic choices that confront the political leadership. To really 
uderstand the public enterprise phenomenon in /'frica today, the 
following questions must be answered V'hv, How and What. 
3. 'ee PAROT, P. L'Enterprise Fublique Instrument de 1'Intervention 
I'conomirnio dc 1 .'tat, en Cot.-.- P'Tvoire. '.^ published Ph.D. thesis, Faculty 
of conomic. Fcier.ces, University of Bordeaux 1, 1976, p. 1. 
it. CAUTPON, J.C s oURER, B. "Les Entreprisr.s Publique et semi-publiques 
au Senegal and CONSTANT IN, F. COULON, C. ' "rvtrenrises publicues et 
changement politioue au Mali in Institut P'Etudes Politinues de Bordeau::, 
Centre, D'Afrioue Noire, Les Enterprises Publigues en 'fri^ ue Noire, I 
Paris, Pedone 1979. 
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The T\y" corresponds to tb reasons influencing the establishment 
of public ent^rp^ise (i.e. state intervention) and also answers the 
question of when. The period factor is important in that it gives us a 
historical perspective enabling us to establish an objective analysis of 
the problematic The time of the establishment or restructing of public 
enterprise provides us with an insight into the under lying structural 
factors (economic, sccial or political) influencing such a move. 
The 'how" nart of the tiple --question asks the following: now 
that the enterprise has been established, what institutional arrangements 
have been made to ensure its efficient fulfilment of laid down objectives? 
The final part, the "What corresponds to an appraisal of not only 
the statutory objectives per _se_, (i.e. efficiency analysis) but also the 
overall conseouences of the role that the public enterprise has played in 
the economic and social transformation o f the society. We ask as to 
whether, public enterprise activities have contributed in reducing or 
entrenching social or regional disparities. In the case of Kenya we 
find that public enterprise, far from contributing to social justice, 
has on the contrary entrenched the social and regional inequalities that 
were incipient at the time of political independence. 
In conclusion we find that the African State, through public 
enterprise, .is nlaying a historic role, in creating social classes who 
in the past were responsible themselves in moulding the state. 
I OBSERVATION 
From the onset, the omnipresence, whatever the political regime, 
of public enterprise seems obvious. As Professor LAVPOFF observes in 
his introduction to the studies on Senegal, Mali and Madagascar: 
"he analvsir (ma.de) by the authors of various studies indicate 
that global ideological options do not rlav a determining role in the 
creation of public enterprise, nor in their rode o'F organization.. . 
Although he rightly observes that there are certainly differences that 
appear depending on th« historical period under consideration (especially 
m the cases of "ali and Madagascar) these are less important when considering 
various other countries. 
Ibid, Preface, IV'. 
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This remark is particularly consistent when we take the examples 
of Kenya and Tanzania. The two States have both adopted the public 
enterori.se system (in most cases with similar internal structures), 
although they have opposite political objectives For Tanzania, the 
creation of a socialist economy is through public enterprise, whereas 
for Kenya the same means serve the exact opposite and public enterprise 
as we shall see, is used to promote private enterprise < The use of 
similar instruments in such cases leads us to the fundamental questions 
as to why the state intervenes in the economy. 
CH• I. THEORETICAL REASONS FOR STATE ENTERPRISE 
Many theories hive been advanced to explain the reasons behind 
State intervention in the economy/' This interventionist!! has a double 
characteristic: on th<=> one hand it takes the indirect form i.e. planning, 
whilst on the other, it is by way of direct participation, through public 
enterprise. It is this latter form of participation that constitutes 
the object of this studv. 
In many 'Third world" countries, and specially in Africa today, 
the role played bv the post-colonial State in the economic affairs has 
drastically increased as a result of exigencies imposed by a new reality. 
It is in this respect that nullic enterprise has become a fundamental 
element in the pursuit of different economic policies. Some scholars even 
consider public enterprise as an indispensable instrument for economic 
development. As Professor Hanson has remarked, Whatever its ultimate 
perspectives, anv country aspiring for economic development bas no 
alternative but to use public enterprise on a. large scale at least for 
7 taking off". 
But wb", ope may ask, should public enterprise be a stimulant 
for the economic development these countries? The answer to this euestion 
is two fold. The first is "or reasons of practicality public enterprise 
turnr out to be the nest Tac t i ca l means to undertake certain public 
ventures. Secondly, and probablv more important, the creation or read-
justment of nublic enterprise has beer motivated for reasons consistent 
F>. See mainly CARFY-JONFSO'.S.) et al. Politics, Public Enterprise and 
the Industrial Development Agency. London: Croor Helm 1074. PP. 7-30 fee 
also L'HERTTHJ (f'.P.) Pourcuoi Pes Entrepriges Publigues? Paris: Presses 
Universitaires Pe Prance, l-f'7, p 67. 
7, HANSON A.H. Public Enterprise anc Development, London: "outlc -
and Kefan Paul, 19Cr> p. 'H . Underlirned by us. 
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with the commanding heights" theory of Estateenterprise origins. Under this 
theory Estate enterprises are established primarily to gain State (or 
national control) over koy economic sectors thought vital for national . 
development and sovereignty It is in this respect that the 'indigenization 
of the economy' (or economic nationalism) factor emerges These are the 
two basic reasons behind public enterprise in Africa today. 
I Practical Reasons for Public Fnterpriso 
A. Instrument of Decentralisation. 
public enterprise is generally considered lore efficient than a 
ministerial department because it possesses legal personality independent 
from the Estate. Moreover, its affairs are managed by an independent board 
though the latter is designated by the government to whom it is responsible 
through (the parent) Ministry. Such a unit can be useful when a government 
department is lacking efficiency. This is probably the reason behind the 
creation o* the National Irrigation Board in 1966 in Kenya when the 
Ministry of Agriculture could not efficiently manage .irrigation projects. 
Thus public enterprise can be seen to be a remedy to bureaucracy. In this 
respect one can evoke the existence of pessimism regarding the improvement 
of civil service bureaucracy and,inversely, the preponderance of the 
r* ' y . .. *ptimist<L-c . conviction that public enterprise constitute a solution to 
q 
comnlcx administrative problems. 
Another important factor emanates -^ rorn the weakness of local 
authorities, resulting in the creation o^ public enterprise to provide 
social and cultural services (housing, libraries, hospitals etc.) 
B. Instrument or- International Cooperation. 
Public enterprise is also an instrument of international 
cooperation. Here it is ^irst of all an important means of promoting 
trade with centrally planned economies (Socialist States), which often 
prefer bilateral dealings. This tvre of arrangement is easier for State 
enterprise to execute than it would be for a private concern, since the 
latter's decisions are always dictated by purely commercial considerations. 
BRADLEY, J., McAUSLAN, S. "Public Corporations in East Africa', in 
FRIEWANN n. , GARNER, J.S (eds), Government Enterprise A Comparative Study, 
New York Columbia University Press, 1°20 p. 268-279. 
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Tn other aspects, agreements with certain countries may result 
in the formation o" public enterprise, to facilitate certain project 
undertaings. \ typical example in the case of Kenya is the Development 
Finance Corporation of Kenya, C.K.) a financial institution created 
by the Dutch, German, British -and Kenyan governments* 
Finally, and still in the context of international cooperation, 
the creation of public enterpri.se m^y be necessary to facilitate the 
execution of regional development projects* ,Tere we can cite the examples 
of the West African Development ""..ink for West Africa and ^ast African 
Development. Tank for East Africa. 
T'fe can see "rorn the above observations, that public enterprise 
has emanated from the practical necessities to facilitate the application 
for diverse projects initiated by the state- Nevertheless, the prolife-
ration of the phenomenon in Africa today his reached such proportions that 
one is forced to wonder whether this is due only to practical necessities,. 
It "is here that the palliative aspect of public enterprise emerges; in 
other words the 3t ate intervenes in those ireas of the economy where 
private capital is reluctant to invest Cro reasons of profit or for lack 
of capital. 
m 
This type of intervention, apart from the mobilising role it 
plays in terms of economic resources, r.fleets the wish to create a 
national base to the extroverted economic structures, mostly dominated 
by :'oreign interests„ This is mainly because t illing in terms of 
capital, the indigenous resources in those countries are very limited. 
So the real nature of public enterprise in Africa today appears to be that 
of in 3nsbrument of economic nationalism. 
TT. "u'llic 'frit or prise and 'Cconomj; "T roionxLism,, 
\» In Tdoology of Pocolonlsati.on? 
\s TrofoiT'or GAU'TlOitf observes regarding the proliferation of 
public enterprise in ^ancopbone countri >s ( State enterprises in iali, 
National enterpri >o in Guinea, •".arketinc Boards and iixed enterprises in 
^aire, Tvorv Toast, Mauritania, Oabon- .), this typo cf intervention is 
each time linked to the desired goal of ensuring the basis of a certain economic-
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independence to a fragile political power." "In all casos' he continues, 
' v find it s a case of nationalisation in the political (and not in the 
Isgal) sense, th^ wish tr concentrate the power in t e bends of the Stats * in 
of its i~enresent?t:ves or its constituents." T.n other words, the 
anlarg^Tiert of tha enlarg «en1 of the public sector is a component of the 
ideology of decolonisation, both a break with the ancient order and m 
attempt ro establish, i not "he equality of the prevailing interests 
(public ?.ne private>, ?t 1' st a durable impossibility of recclorisation 
in the future. 
What ^ofcss'T cri'P'1!: says is that the e^rv.r-'-Ii.tv of the 
phe nor-.non makes it an 5deological variable independent from tlie 
i b^olorically adopted corpr.;, adopted and diffused by ttr ooliticai 
authorities, a compulsory meeting point o41 the ideologies o~ 
decolonisation and dev-:>lopr.fnt". 
This amlvsir ipnli.es to all African Stf.tos, b.- it "the Ivory 
Coast which practices n extr-me economic liberalism where 'none of the 
ideological reasons '-rh normally motivate the crv rvtion of en important 
industrial public rector c-.n be cited, or Tanzania which -practices 
the most doctrinaire African socialism on the Oonti r»-nt, •loth Countrie • 
have important public sect.-.ra despite 'inreticall" opposed noliticel 
doctrines. 
This that the public enterprise ^ormuie transcends traditional 
ideological barrier?. i"••> ideological aimstion only corn1- " in when it is a 
question of what type of control one wishes to exert on i-be ecoronv, As 
Nyerar-.; nuts it, "the question is not whether nations control their economy, 
but hov;. The real ideological choiee is between control orivate 
national enterprise o- control by State or Collective Institution ,13 
In the case of Tanzania, the post - '^u^ ha Intervention has been meant 
to 1. it rather than enlarge the nrivnte national initiative. On the other 
bam1, sir'lar action by the State in hot) '<,.nya and tvc Ivorv Coast has meant 
•LT' • ,T- - L<. tiitrenris.'-!-- Publ'oues, Acteur et Indicateur du 
ch nrement social ir Revue Franeai*e -1 etudes noliticues Africaines, No 158, 
Feb. 1979. Paris, p. • . '— 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
P'THTIL do in P Q T , T . T'Btat et le Development rconomiciue en Cote 
voirt . rr-rie • Ped.or-e, lf'7f p : ' 
V * - ;/"fPrrr J- freedom and Socialism London, Mew YorV. Nairobi: Oxford ;?niversitv Press ;—opt ' ' 
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- the political discourse accompanying this action and which may 
reflect the long-term strategies and political objectives of the ruling 
group. . - -•' 
It is with these factors ^n mind we can fully comprehend the 
reasons for State intervention in Kenya. 
B. The Kenyan Case fricani sation" or Economic 
Nationalism without Nationalisation. 
The circumstances under which Kenya obtained her political 
independence have been analysed by historians: the particular]v brutal 
colonial oppression resulted in the dramatic Mau-Mau uprising of the 
early fifties which made the colonial settler authorities hand over 
State power earlier than they had expected.. Thus in 1963 the nev.T African 
government inherited an economic and social structure whiph corresponded 
neither to the needs nor to the aspirations of the African majority. 
Industrial production was oriented towards the,fabrication ,of consumer 
products for a privileged minority constituted mainly of foreigners of 
Eritish origin. 
In the agricultural sector the problem was more pressing given 
the origins of the peasant revolt. The land question was the most acute 
political problem. Tha production of cash crops was restricted only to 
the European settlers till the eve of independence. Besides, the land 
distribution was far from fair: in 1962 some 3000 settlers were occupying 
26 million hectares of the best farmland, whilst • the 7 million or so 
1 7 Africans were forced to share 9n million hectares.x 
The commercial, financial and banking sectors reflected the same 
tendency, i.e. foreign domination The African population had no access 
to credit facilities and was practically excluded from the high echelons of 
both public and private sectors. 
Faced with this situation, the new administration had two options: 
either it maintained the existing capitalistic structures and only giving 
See CAUTPON, J.C. art. cit. p. 45. 
PO^ESTEP, Kepv? Today. Social Prerequisites ior Economic Develor.-menL.-
The Hague• "outon and" 196? p. 58, 
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them the 'African Look or opt for an economic and social revolution 
by nationalising the land and important industries. In one case or 
another, it was still African nationalism that would prevail. It is in 
this context that we should recall the economic policy pursued by Kenya 
sinceindeoendence, especially regarding State participation. 
1) Rejection of Nationalization 
In the general elections of ¥ay, 1963 it was KANU that won with 
its programme oF "African Socialism." In its electoral manifesto, the 
triumphant party unequivocally rejected any measure of nationalisation; 
"( ..) Following our desire to create a Socialist state, we believe to large 
extent on public control of the economy in the national interest. There 
18 are many ways of participation without public appropriation.:' 
Jomo Kenvatta, then Prime Minister, emphasised a year later that 
nationalisation would not help in promotingthe exigencies of (African) 
19 
socialism. The anti-nationalisation stance was even incarnated m 
the Republican Constitution, in article 75. This safeguards private 
property against any exprorriation, except in exceptional circumstances 20 where the law guarantees prompt and comnlc-te compensation. 
The philosophical blue-print of the government's economic and 
social policy is the famous Sessional Paper Mo. 10 of 1965- African 
Socialism end its Application to Planning in Kenya. This document 
resumes succintly the government's attitude to the role of the State 
in the economy. After rejecting nationalisation per se, it says that the 
government would take measures to eliminate classes that were created 
on racial bases' . To implement this, the document mentioned four 
objectives- assistance in the form, of capital to the African entrepreneurs; 
expansion of services in all sectors o £ the economy, the' creation of 
mixed enterprises and the Kenyanisation (i e. Africanisation) of the Public 
sector. Besides, the Public sector was going to develop faster than any 
2"! other sectors to become the biggest source of employment for the Africans. 
18. KANU Manifesto- What a KANU Government Offers You. Nairobi, p. 22 
Undeligned by us. 
19. East African Journal, Nairobi Vol 1. No- 7 Nov, 1964, p. 17 
20. See The| Constitution_of Kenya Nairobi: Government Printer, 
1969, p. 36-38. * 
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It is in this context that we should analvse the origins and the role of 
Dublic enterprise in Kenya, 
2) Origins of Publicj-nterprise in Kenva • 
Fublic enterprise in Kenya dates from the colonial era, with the 
establishment of vnrious Commodity Boards following the 192° crisis. 
ror example, the Imperial Orconance o^ March 1931 created the Land and 
Agricultural Eank, which was to constitute a major source of credit for 
the Colonial Settlers. Regulatory Boards were to follow until almost all 
agricultural Commodity production and marketing were controll bv various 
Boards, especially after the Second Ho rid War. It was during this time that 
public enterprise of the industrial and commercial type appeared (K.M.C -
Kenjra "eat Commission in 1350 and the Industrial Development Corporation 
I.D.C. in 1954). 
At the time of independence, there was already in existence an 
important public sector. It should be emphasised though, that all this 
.intervention during the colonial era was in the interests of the settler 
minority. After independence, therefore, the priority was to reverse 
the tendency, and, as we have already s^een, the aim of the State in the 
post-colonial era was to integrate the African into the capitalist 
4 
production process. Various boards were to be 1Africanised' and policy 
changes implemented so as to serve the Africans. Where necessary, new 
institutions were to be created as part of the integrative strategy. 
This partly explains the proliferation of public enterprises. An 
important factor that we should add is that political contingencies 
have also played en importart part in this process, and the evolution 
of the political structures has largely influenced the pattern of State 
intervention. Here we can outline three stapes of transformation: the 
first pha se is the period that immediately followed independence, i.e. 1963-
1966 the second one is the period during which the country had a legalised 
opposition party (1966-1969) the third one is during the last decade when 
the regime has krown some ideological homogeneity. 
i) 1963 -1966 primacy of the Agricultural Sector. 
This was a transitional period after independence, and the priority 
For the new authorities was the immediate satisfaction of nationalist 
aspirations of the African masses. For "the majority of the African population 
composed of more than 90% peasants, the most immediate preoccupatior, was the 
land question the repartition o^ land ^rd the organisation of agricultural 
- 12 - IDS/VIP 390 
production, whether commercial or subsistence. 
The verv existence of several Regulatory and Commodity Boards in 
the Agricultural sector meant that the Colonial State tightly controlled 
agricultural production. Discriminatory legislation excluded the Africans 
from cash-crop farming and they moreover bad no access to the fertile lands 
of the highlands. It was therefore not surprising that there were no 
Africans sitting on various Boards. After independence these were the 
first targets of the policy of ' 'A. fri can i sat ion' - this was done either by 
putting Africans in these boards or non-Africans who were favourable to 
the African interests. 
At the same time the government either created new institutions 
or reorganised others to implement the new policy. The aim of the newlv-
formed settlement Fund Trustees was to facilitate the setting of landless 
Africans, and the role of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (restructured 
from land Agricultural Bank) was to give credit facilities to these 
Africans wishing to procure farms from the settlers. Although there was 
no consensus amongst the political leadership cts to what economic policy 
to adopt, the opposing FACTORS within KAI'U agreed on one point: the 
urgency of the Africanization of the public sector and the economy at 
large. 
ii) 1966-1970 Assault on the Commercial Sector 
The creation of a potentially strong opposition party in 1966 
(Kenya People's Union or K.P.U.) was a manifestation of a growing 
disenchantment with government policy. The new party crystallised, the 
deception of those who believed that the africar.isation process was too 
Slow on one hand, and also those who felt that the prevailing economic 
nolicy would not onlv recreate in a new context, but reinforce the 
inegalitarian socio-economic structure or the colonial past. In other 
words, the foreign privileged class would only be replaced (or rejoined) 
by a new indigenous one. The reaction of the government was to hastily 
accelerate africanisation in new sectors, particularly in the services and 
small scale industry. This move was intended not only to limit the spread 
of discontent, but was also to serve in widening the base of the political 
clientele of the regime given that similar efforts in small-scale 
agriculture seemed to be bearing fruit. 
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The year 1967 v.s the turning point in this new policy. A new 
series of laws were passed to facilitate its application. In the 
comrercial sector the Trade I.icencinr Act of 1967 restricts non-citizens 
(in theory hut non-Africans' in practice) to only certain areas and to 
22 
deal in specific poods ' This forced thousands of British nationals 
(mainly of Asian extraction) to sell out their business- It is at this 
juncture that the Industrial Development Corporation was restructed and 
became the Industrial ~nd Commercial Development Corporation, (I.C.D.C.) 
thereby introducing a new loan scheme to help the nationals acquire 
business. The I.C.D C. through its subsidiary, the Kenya National Trading 
Corporation (the KN.T.C.) embarked on wholesale trading, soon acquiring 
monopoly in certain basic commodities (Sugar, Salt, Cement, maize meal etc). 
This measure was certainly intended to ensure a steady suoplv of goods to 
the new African merchants. 
In the transport sector the Transport Licencing Act (Amendment) of 
1968 created the Transport Licencing Board, a public body that was to further 
the Kenyanization of the trade. 
(iii) 1°7Q-1977 The Emergence of the Public Financial Sector 
and Hjder Participation in the 'Manufacturing Sector. 
In 1970, the banking sector was still more than 80% foreign controlled 
23 
(Barclays, Crindlays, Standard).'" These banks had very few Africans amongst 
their clients, given their conditions for loan disbursement. So the State 
decided to create its own banks alongside the existing ones to serve the 
indigenous population. In this exercise it bought the National and 
Grindlay (which became the Kenya Commercial Bank), created the Corporative 
Bank of Kenya and the National Bank of Kenya. 
In the insurance sector, the State took over the monopoly of the 
reassurance business through the law that created the State "eiinsurance 
Corporation in 1922, In general insurance, the State participation has 
been minimal- we can cite only two State owned insurance groups: Kenya 
National Assurance and Minet I.C.D.C. 
See Government of Kenya, Trade Licencing Act of 1967 Cap .497) 
Nairobi Government Printer, 196*77 
See JOPTNSE" J. "MultinationalCorporations and the Indi<?enisation 
the Kenyan Economy" in WIPSTRAND, C. ed. , ''Multinational Firms in Africa, 
Uppsala S.I.A.S., 1975. 
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In the manufacturing sector, the decade of the 70's has witnessed 
the multiplication of State participation in various ventures, This has 
been done mainly through the I C.D.C. which has consequently become the 
major State holding company. As we shall observe later on in the paper, 
this Corporation has not only created its own subsidiary companies, but 
has acted as tbe intermediary in tbe acquisition by the State of shares in 
various ventures, both national and foreign. 
iv) Since 1974- TV. appearance o f the Regional Development Corporation 
The year 1974 saw the emergence of tbe Public enterprise intended 
for rural development, with tbe voting by Parliament of the Tana River 
Development Authority Act. The T.R.D.A. has been given the mandate to 
promote the development of the Tana piver Basin- Two similar institutions 
have recently been established. Tn October 1970 President Moi announced 
the creation of the Lake Basin Development Authority to coordinate the 
development projects around Lake Victoria Basin. In January the following 
year, the Kerio ,Talley Development Authority was formed with the intention 
of exploiting the economic potential of this region to the north west of 
the Rift Valley. We can conclude that the birth of this type of 
institution underlines the preoccupation of the political leadership in 
developinr the rural are^s whose potential, both in human and economic 
terms, have for Ion" been neglected. 
The pre wing r.'veals the diversity of both the origins and the role 
of public enterprise in Kenya. Such a diversity necessarilv implies the 
adoption op appropriate institutional arrangements if the public enterprise 
has to fulfill its functions This is the obiect of the second chapter of 
this paper. 
CHAPTER II WHAT IS H'PLIC EIN^P^RISE? 
Understanding th" development of Public Enterprise in an under-
development economy supposes, ri^bt from the onset, the exact apprehension 
of the notion of this very t^ nae of enterprise. If generally by 'public 
enterprise one means any enterprise belonging wholly on partially to the 
public -authorities, its legal identification is a problematic, 
Before we look at the institutional framework of public enterprise 
we must define the concept" if public enterprise is an economic instrument 
of State intervention, it is above all a structure by which the State 
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positively participates in appropriating, running or controlling industries 
and services. 
Since the legal systems of the colonial powers have influenced 
those of their former colonies, it is not suprising that legal codes and 
texts in these particular counries are mostly of metropolitan inspiration. 
Public enterprise is nc exception. As SUBRIPUFV recalls, it is the 
metropolitan company law that was applicable during the colonial times 
regarding commercial transactions, since customary law had no provisions 
for limited liability companies etc. and those wishing to form industrial 
or commercial companies were thus obliged to submit to the laws of the 
. . . 24 colonising power. 
In spite of the generalisation of colonial legacy, some countries 
have made certain innovations in this respect, especially as regards 
95 
organic dispositions and. methods of State control The most important 
factor in these countries has been the systematic state intervention, 
which has resulted in the expansion of the public and semi-public sector. 
This pandiculation of the public sector is characterised, mainly by the 
creation ex-nibilo of companies wholly owned by the State (which is a 
new phenomenon), op increased shareholding (both majority and minority) 
in private firms. One is thus led to ask what public enterprise .in 
Africa is today whether the concept still covers the same notion as 
in the countries of origins. For reasons of comparison, a comparative 
people of French and English Laws in this matter will demonstarate the 
way in which different structures can generate similar institutions. 
Prom, the internal viewpoint we shall observe how existing notions are 
used in confronting new needs and in the process these notions are 
modified or even transformed. 
1. The Notion of publ?':c Enterprise in French Law, 
In the French legal system, the concept of public enterprise is 
not juridical in itseJ*". It nevertheless evokes the notion of public 
service. This is what Dc' LAUBADERE refers to when he declares that 
SUBPTPJTT, M Les Seciete's n lrccmo?V, Mjxte . dams les- Pays, en Vole 
dr n-j'y,j.oprri.Tit W r i i de L 'Exempli ^al cache"! Paris1 Librairie Generale 
du Proit st d' Jurisorud-. ce, 1Q70, P."•"•'' • • •.•'. •. 
r good example is the SEMEPAL. See for instance, GAUTRON, J.C, et ai. 
Les Entreprises fubliqaes au Senegal" in C.E.A.N., Bordeaux. Les. Entreprise 
.'hibliciues en 'frioue Noire op. cit. , p. 31 et sec 
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IXl 
economic interventionism "constitutes in itself a public service' . In 
this manner, he further explains, public enterprise is integrated in the 
27 
juridical reality of "interventionist public institution' , 
According to MARTIN PANNETIER, if the term public enterprise" 
probably has no rigorous juridical content, it defines the "'appearance, 
fairly recent but very common, of the intervention by the State in the eg 
exercising of economic activity.*'" Professor DRAGO, whilst agreeing with 
this approach, states further that Public enterprise is that enterprise 
2Q 
whose capital belong in whole or in majority to the State, It nroceeds 
to enumerate what he considers as the three elements identifying such an 
enterpriser the holding by the public authorities of capital in such an 
enterprise the submission of such an enterprise to private law and lastly 30 the relative dependence of the enterprise vis-vis the public authorities. 
This definition is rather ambiguous, because although the degree of 
public participation is Qualified, it is not quantified. SOBRIOUEY, though 
not quantifying his definition, is at least clearer in his description. 
According to him, the notion of public enterprise relates "to all the 
enterprises whose management is dominated by the state by exercising 
on (them) a variable degree of authority, whilst they remain subject to a 
maximum regime of alignment on the working rules and methods of the 
private (enterprise) "" For certain scholars, the notion covers three 
26. Di; LAUBADFRE, A. Tr^.ite" Elcmentilre de Droit Administratif °aris 
Librarie Penerale de Droit et de Juri snudence, 196P> . vol. 3, p. 481. 
27. Ibid. 
23. MARTIN-P4NNETIER, A, Elements d'Analyse Comparative des 
Etablissements Publics en Droit Anglais et en Droit Franfais. Paris 
Librarie Generale de DROIT et de Jurispundence, 1966, p. 16. 
29. DRAGON, N. "Public Enterprises in rrance , in FRIEDMAN? GARNER, eds, 
op.cit., p. 107. 
30. Ibid. 
31. SOBRIQUET, M. on. cit. p. 24. 
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principal categories public industrial and commercial institutions 
( etablissements"), netionaj companies (societe's nationales) and certain 
32 
mixed enterprises. MARTIN-n^NNTTIER on the other hand, distinguishes 
public enterprise from industrial and commercial public institution 
(etablissement public industriel et commercial"), though thev both belong 
to what she terms as a "public economic institution ( etablissement public 
economicue"), which she qualifies as a moral person created by public 
authoritv but is object to a mixed (internal) system, r,exercisinr an economic 
. . . 33 activity m the general interest .' This she contrasts to the public 
administrative institution ' establissement public ••lduinistrataf) which, 
though is a moral person created by public authority, is subject to the 
re(Tv>= 0 f public law while ensuring the management of a public service without 
profit motivation in sn optic of decentralization. 
English law or an English-inspired J.eral system not being dichotomised 
and as systematic as the French one, does not offer such a simplified 
approach. This is where such terms as ''Parastataland Public Corporations 
emerge when one talks of public enterprise in such a contest. 
II. "ho Notion of Parastatal in Kenya. 
The term ' Parastatal" is one of the innovations that have been 
hatched in the ''Third World" countries whose legal systems are of British 
inspiration. The term, is not legalistic in itself, but is a concent Peculiar 
to these countries and express a specif-'c historical development. Although 
the definition is not standardised the expression generally covers any 
organism distinct from administrative departments (central or local) but is 
answerable to public authority. 
It is in Tanzania that a statutory definition was first attempted, 
with the creation of the Permanent Committee on Parastatal Organisations 
way back in 196 7. This Committee was charged, inter-alia, with the studying 
of salaries and terms of service of the personnel of these organisations 
with the view of aligning them with, those of the Civil Service, To guide 
the Committee in its task., a Parastatal Organisation was defined as an 
institution, organisation or agency which is wholly or mainlv financed, or 
owned and controlled by the government. The criterion of such public 
• See mainly L'HEFITAU, ".F., op.cit. P. 64 et seq. 
33. MARTH'-PAWPETIEP, A. op. cit. P. 24 
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enterprises (Sic) would be ownership by government of 50 per cent or 
more of the capital shares, or other forms of governmental participation 
and effective influence in all the main asoects of management of the 
• • 34 enterprise . 
This definition being inadequate (tbe 50?; equity shares is not 
sufficient to controJ an enterprise), it was the creation of the Tanzania 
Legal Corporation in 1972 which resulted in a more rigorous definition of 
tHe-- concept. The role of the Legal Corporation was to render legal services 
to Parastatals. In the Act institution the Corporation a Parastatal was 
defined thus 
(a) A body corporate established by or under anv written 
law other than 
i) A Company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance. 
ii) A body corporate established by or under any Act of 
the Community. 
iii) A Local Authority. 
(h) Anv Company registered under the Companies Ordinance, not 
less than 50 per cent of the issue share capital of which 
is owned by the Government, a Local Authority or any 
pareststal organization or where the company is limited 
by guarantee a company has undertaken to contribute in 
the event to the company being wound UP is not less than 
50 per cent of the aggregate amount which all members 
have undertaken to contribute and. reference in this 
paragraph to a parastatal organisation includes reference 
to -pv such company. 
(c) Any body of persons whether comcrate or incorporate, 
which is designated by the Minister by Wotice in the 
Gazette" to be a parastatal organisation for the purpose 
35 of this Order.'' 
34. See JAMES P .W,, LUPGUNYA, S. "Organisational "elationshin and Contro 
of Parastatals in Tanzania in KATNDE, J.W. et.al. co.cit., p. 103. 
35. Ibid. P. 10u-
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This comprehensive definition bv the Tanzania government apparently 
dir* not serve as an example to its Kenyan counterpart, when President Moi 
announced the creation of the Parastatals Advisory Committee in December 1979. 
The Presidential directive did not define a Parastatal, as in the case of 
Tanzania. In the absence of a statutory (or official) definition of a 
Parastal in Kenya, we can however claim there exists an official or an 
implicit one. The official nomenclature of public and semi-public 
organisation as established by the Central Bureau of Statistics gives an 
insight into this problematic. This document lists these in three 
categories- Parastatal Bodies- rirms with Majority Control by Public Sector: 
Firms with Minority Share-holding by °ublic Sector. 
This definition" differs drastically from the Tanzani.a case it 
suggests that only a firm or an organisation controlled entirely by tbe 
state can he regarded as a Parastatal, thus excluding all the firms in 
which the state holds majority shares. In which case the Kenyan conception 
of a :Parastcatal is very close to what tbe rrench term an Establissement 
public', which can bo divided into three categories: administrative, corporate 
36 
or professjonal, and interventionist bodies. This is illustrated by 
the fact that inspite of the absence of any dichotomy private/public law 
in Kenya, one finds under the denomination of Parastatal diverse 
organisations as the University of Nairobi, the Teachers' Service 
Commission and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
(administrative, professional and interventionist bodies respectively). 
Since the object of our study is public enterprise meaning 
commercial or industrial ventures in which the State or its representatives 
has some stake, we cannot include such institutions as the University of 
Nairobi or the Teachers Service Commission. This means that public 
enterprise is part of the Parastatal Structure and is composed of both 
public corporations and mixed enterprises. It is tbe latter that interest 
us since they have some incidence on the economic and social transformations 
that constitute the object of this studv. 
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P£PT II: Public Enterprise • An Agent of Economic and 
Social Change in Kenya. 
Public Enterprise in the Kenyan Economy 
Inspite of an economic policy favouring the primacy of private 
enterprise, the State, through the public, sector, Plays an important 
role in the accumulation process ancl the social transformations that 




Due to the fact that the Kenyan State is highly centralised, 
the public sector contribution to the G.D.P. is mainly through central 
government which has realised a stronger growth since independence* whereas 
in 1964 it contributed 12.9% of the G.D.P., this proportion attained 
13.2ft in 1976 (See Table 1). 
1964 1972 1975 1976 1977 
Central Government 70.9 ? 151.13 110.04 139.611 
Local Authorities 11.1 7 18.52 21.93 225.30 
East African Community 2.5 4,9 59.8 - -
Public Enterprises (Parastatals) 0.7 33 1 40.12 173.75 190.24 
Total Public Sector 
TOTAL P.P.P. 
% G.D.P. 
79.6 193,8 269.58 305.72 355.12 
330.1 547.38 1028.93 1262.9 1620.2 
24.1 363 26.2 2 a. 2 21,9 
Table 1: Evolution and Repartition o£ Public Sector 
Contribution to the G.r, «P. (196^ -1977) 
This progression wrs due to the increase in government services! for 
examplet^e part of education almost doubled between 1952 and 1976, from 
3-4% to 6.1% of G.D.P. ). This progression was due mainly to the increase 
in government services (for example, the oart of education almost doubled 
between 1964 and 1976 from ?.4% to 6.1% of G.D.W.). During the same per: . 
the contribution by the pnrastatals registered a decline: from 12.2% in 
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dropped to 10$ in 1976, proving that interns of value added the parastatal 
sector produced negative results. 
In terms of capital formation on the other hand, the part of the 
public sector has registered a steady growth: from 25% in 1964, it reached 
42s; in 1976. The parastatal sector contribution also increased steadily 
during the same period, from 15.2°?. It must be emphasised, however, that 
the greater part of this increase was due to the transfer of the assets 
of the defunct East African Community (namely Railways, Posts and Tele-
communications etc..,). Therefore the public sectcr, though largely 
eclipsed by the private sector, mobilises a considerable prooortiop of 
the country's economic resources, with the parastatals spearheading 
public investment. According to the current Development Plan, for example, 
out of 463.8 million shillings earmarked for industrial development by 
the public sector, 384.6 million (or 87%) would be handled by public 
37 
enterprise. This investment would be carried out either through credit 
to entrepreneurs (both national and foreign) or in the form of equity 
participation. It is with this strategy in mind that we are now going to 
look at the balance sheet of public enterprise activity in Kenya since 
independence. 
In the evaluation of performance of any enterprise, it is normally 
the term "efficiency" that is employed. But then, what is efficiency, It 
is a legitimate ouestion to ask given the array of objectives commonly 
established *or state-owned firms in less developed countries. For 
private enterprise, the criterion for efficiency is normally the pro fi teaming 
capacity. For public enterprise,this kind of evaluation can not be the only 
yard-stick. What is difficult, however, it to determine which other criteria 
should be taken into account, how each of these criteria should be evaluated 
and how they can be weighed against each other. 
It is clear that the appreciation of public enterprise performance 
depends ipgo facto on the chosen criterion. There is therefore a 
controversory as to the relative importance that should be accorded to 
allocative (or economic) efficiency and national or social efficiency m>d 
as how to reconcile the two concepts. More by ommission than by commission, 
the accounting system which produces data from which performance evaluation 
See Government of Kenya- Development pIan 1979-193? Nairobi: Government 
Printer 1979, p. 345. 
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can be made is largely dependent on the concent of commercial profitability. 
On the other hand, if the evaluation of national profitability'' by cost/ 
benefit analysis is undertaken it usually concerns new projects rather 
38 
than existing ones and particular cases than a systematic one. 1 As a 
U.N. Working ("roup observed, 'in far too many development nlans, the 
potential contribution of public enterprises has been presented as an 
almost automatic product of the magnitude of the capital invested in them, 
on tbe basis of ever--simplified calculations of rates between capital and 
output . 
Our objective is not to go into the details of the commercial 
performance of each public enterprise. Rather we shall dwell on the 
overall appraisal of public enterprise activity in relation to its basic 
philosophical raison d'etre in Kenya. Being an instrument of economic 
nationalism, public enterprise has been used to promote private African 
enterprise: this has certainly had some impact on the social and 
political scenery in the country. 
CH. 1. public Enterprise and Social Change in the Agricultural Sector. 
In Kenva the Parastatals in the agricultural sector have mostly 
been regulatory marketing, managerial and financial. The majority of 
them have played two (at least) roles at the same time, especially in 
regulating and marketing major agricultural produce. On the eve of 
independence, the most pressing political problem was the land ouestion. 
Agrarian reform was the ultimate answer to a hypothetical peasant 
uprising similar to that of "Mau-Mau", and in this objective the 
parastatals were to play a key role. Those already in existence had to 
be restructured or ova hauled in response to new demands, and new ones 
had to be created' to effectively implement new policies regarding 
resettlement and cash crop production (coffee, tea, pyrethrum, sugar etc.). 
The Swynnerton plan of 1954 was aimed at liberalising land tenure 
and cash crop production in the former White Highlands to allow the 
African populatiop to participate in this industry This measure was 
obviously designed to act as a political safety valve in creating a 
38. See Report of a U.N. Working r^oup-. Measures for Improving the 
Performance of Public Pnternrise in Developing Countries Vol. 1 ST/TAO/M/V 
in KATENDE, J. et.al op_.cit.po. 1139-1142. 
39. Ibid P. 1140. 
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privileged class of African peasants who would in turn collaborate with 
the colonial regime in thwarting the nationalist thrust. The land reform 
(i.e. land registration) and the new agricultural nolicv were therefore 
the two major elements of this new policy. The recognition of individual 
land tenureship was going, to facilitate loan acquisition (through the 
title deed) and farm development by the privileged few Africans. These 
measures were well under implementation when independence came in 1963. 
By 1962, for example, some 3000 farms covering almost a million hectares 
40 had been allocated at a cost of 7 million pounds sterling. 
The impact in terms of revenue for the new commodity producers was 
tremendous- it is estimated that their income rocketed from a negligible 
41 sum to more than 14 million pounds that year. 
These operations of resettlement" were to continue after 
independence, this time under the auspices of a Parastatal, the Settlement 
Fund Trustees. The first phase was under the appellation "One Million Acre 
Scheme' which was stopped in 1972 when it was realised that not only were 
the new owners experiencing difficulties in loan repayments, but also 
productivity lapsed. At that time, 429,129 hectares was hecupied by 
42 
14,177 families, with the size of the holdings ranging from 4.5ha. to . 
43 38 hectares. " As C. Leys has remarked, in spite of the relative drop 
in productivity, these families attained a level of subsistence much 
44 
higher than the national average. A new scheme was thereafter introduced 
called "Shirika?i underwhich the former European-owned farms would not be 
subdivided but accuired intact, with the Settlement Fund Trustees 
providing the management services. By 1976, 12^000 people (out of the 
anticipated 17,000) had acquired 105 farms-averaging 1035 hectares each-at 45 a cost of 126 million shillings . 
40. See McNilliam, M. "The Managed Economy: Agricultural Change, 
Development and Finance , in Low, D.A. Smith, A., eds., History of East 
Africa. 0xpord: Clarendon Press, 1976. Vol. Ill, p. 264. 
41. Ibid. 
42. See Statistical Abstract 1976, Nairobi' Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, Government "rinter, p. 116. 
43. Figures calculated from ibid. 
44. Leys, C. Underdevelopment in Kenya- The Political Economy of 
vec Colonialism. London- Heinemann 1975 pp. 75-76. 
45. Statistical Abstract 1976, p. 196 TaMe 31 (b). 
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With an active programme of vulgarisation, the state has 
accelerated the participation of the Nationals in the production of 
tea, coffee and pyrethrum, the principal export commodities of the 
country. 
I. K.T.D.A. and the Tea Industry. 
The Kenya Tea Development Authority is. probably the Parastatal 
that has contributed most in the transformation of the rural landscape 
by transfering the bulk of tea production into the hands o^ the small-
scale producer from the big estates since independence. In 1963, for 
example, the small-holder sector accounted for only 17% of the acreage 
unde-e tea. By 1976 this proportion had risen to 63% desnite a lower 
U5 
productivity rate. As table 2 indicates, this tendency is geared to 
continue, with a targeted 67% in 1983 (according to the current Development 
plan). Whilst the acreage of big estate will have expanded by a smaller 
margin (8,500 hectares, i e . an increase of. 50%) the small-holder sector • 47 -will have expanded by 48,000 hectares, an increase of more than 1400%. 
f 
1963 1973 1976 1983 
^ (Projected) 
Big Fstate ^ 17,921 24,000 25,500 26,500 
Small-holder " 3,527 32,000 44,000 52,000 
% 16.4 57.1 62,9 66.2 
TOTAL 21,440 56,000 70,000 ' 78,500 
Table No. 2: Evolution of types of tea plantations, 1963-1883 
(in hectares) 
In terms of income, K.T.D.A paid these growers a total of 402.8 
million shillings for the preen tea delivered to its various factories in 
48 
1979. Apart from processing tea from the small-holders, the K.T.D.A. 
offers technical and financial assistance to its clients, and provides 
the necessary infrastructural and 1 gistical support. 
46. The small-holders produced onlv 53* the 62000 tonnes in 1976. 
47. The averare size of these Farms is quite small: 0.39 hectares in 
1979, with the number of small-holders standing at 126169.-
48. By then the- K.T.D.A- h*d 25 tea fs-c-t-ories compared to 12 in 1973. 
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This transformation has taken place to the detriment of a multi-
national comnany, Brooke Bond Limited, which had enjoyed the monopoly 
of cultivation, processing and marketing o F tea since 193S. 
II. Coffee and Dyrethrum Industries 
The transfer of the coffee industrv into the hands of the indigenous 
population has followed a similar trend as that of tea. In 1976 56,000 
hectares out of the 86,400 ha. (i.e. 66?) that were under coffee belonged 
49 
to the small-holder sector (especially cooperatives). This is another 
growing sector, because by 1983 between 33,000 and 35,000 more hectares will 
be added (according to the current Development Plan) to this particular 
sector. Here, it is the Coffee Board which is responsible for the 
transformation, since it is the one responsible for issuing licences 
to farmers and controls the marketing. 
Coffee has been one of the most lucrative crons for the small-
holder. In 1978, 57% of the 82,325 tones peoduced nationally came from 
this sector, earning the cooperatives some 12.08 billion shillings. It 
is estimated that the same year the small-holder earned an average of 
50 27,400 shillings. 
Pyrethrum is another cash cron whose production has been 
nationalised' through the intervention of a parastatal (i.e. Pyrethrum 
Marketing Board). From an insignificant proportion at independence, the 
small-scale sector produced of the 176 tones that the country produced 
51 m 1976, earning them, some 88 million shillings. 
III. Irrigation Settlements 
Besides the vulgurisation of the above commodities, another 
Parastatatal, the National Irrigation Board (N.I.B.) has been active in 
improving the revenue of a number of families in rural areas. This 
Parastatal has been mainly active around Lake Victoria Basin and around 
upper Tana. 
49. The rest belonged to the estates, the majority of-'wtrveh are now owned 
by indigenous people (nearly 74% in 1978/79). See Orffoe- Roard of 
Kenya, Annual Feport 1979, Nairobi. 
50. Compared to 33,760 shillings to previous year.. See Nation Economic 
Report 1980, Nairobi Nation Newspapers Ltd. 
51. See the Statistical Abytract_Aq_ZlL:. 
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The number of persons settled in these schemes is hardly impressive 
although the figure has doubled since the creation of the N.I.P. in 1967, 
from 234? to 4650 in 1973 , with the irrirated area following the same pattern, 
from 3,873 hectares to °,5o5 ha. Although the cost of these operations is 
not known (due to lack of data), irrigation does not seem to benefit a wide 
number of peasants as one vould expect. Settling only 2,308 families in 
ten years (i.e. an average of 230 per year) is not a good indicator of 
worthwhile investment both economical).y and socially, more so when the 
birth rate stands at more than 3.6% n e r annum. 
Nonetheless, the- level of income of these families is much higher 
than the national average for rural households. In 1978, they earned an 
52 
average of 7,860 shillings" a figure four times the national average. 
As the 1974/75 government rural survey revealed, 41% of rural households 
had an annual income (including subsistance) of less than 2,000 shillings 
per year and 2?Q- of these bad 1,000 shillings or less per year." This 
study not only revealed the extent of rural poverty, but also that of regional 
disparities. Thus the majority of the families in the latter category 
(i.e. those earning less than 1,000 shillings per annum) were to be found 
in western Kenya (Nyanza and Western provinces, with 25% and 32% 
respectively). This imbalance can be attributed to the fact that these 
regions participate least in the production or exportable cash-crops 
(see table 3). As table 3 indicates, it is Eastern and Central Provinces 
that account for the largest acreage in terms of expert cash-crop • 
production over 50% for pyrethrum, more than 56% for coffee and over 
80% for tea. It .is therefore logical to conclude that other factors 
notwithstanding (ecological and climatic variations, for example), the 
reforms carried out b\ the -narastatals involved in the export commodity 
production have contributed to regional imbalance. 
It is not only smallholders who have benefited from the activities 
of narastatals in tbe agricultural sector: the State has also encouraged 
other modes of appropriation in the form of large farms or estates. In 
this sector, two parastatals have been most active the Agricultural 
Development Corporation (.•'•.D.C.) and tbe Agricultural Finance Corporation. 
52. Calculated from the Statistical Abstract 1973, table 101, 
63. See Development l^-,n 1979-63 OP.cit, P. 146-147. 
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PROVINCE "ooulation Pyrethrum > Coffee Tea 
Central 2,289,881 9.0 32.1 37.3 
Coast 561 ,695 - - -
Eastern 2,380,27 3 1.4 49.0 11.0 
Nyanza 2,541,692 9.5 9.7 5.4 
Pi-ft Valley 674,285 0 .9 0.1 3.5 
Western 1,893,348 - 1.1 1.8 
TOTAL 10,341,174 22.4 92 .0 59 .0 
Table No. 3: Distribution of small-farms bv commodity (in , 000's acres) 
and by Province and Population (pastoral zones excluded). 
Source: Statistical Abstract 1978, table 192 and 112 
A.D.C., A.F.C. and Lati-findia Africana 
The Agricultural Development Corporation was created in 1965 with the 
objective of securing the transfer of large farms intact to the Nationals. 
This was done either by resale or bv leasing the farms that the state had 
bought from the settlers In 1971, the A.D.C. started concentrating mainly 
on State farms, which are mostly esperimental, specialising in mixed farming, 
and seedling production. By 1978, A.D.C. had bought a total of 98 farms, 
out of which 72 had been sold to the Nationals. 
The conditions for the acquisition of farm seriously limited the 
number of candidates, the aspirant had to be in a solid financial position 
(supported by a bankers letter), and prove his/her competence through a 
recommen&ition from the district agricultural officer and answer certain 
technical questions if a manarer were to be employed to run the farm. 
Obviously these conditions favoured only those who already were in 
Dossession of capital or whose political affiliations facilitated access 
to capital. This is how businessmen, politicians and civil servants have 
become farmers in Kenya. Through A.D.C. and A.F.C. , these people managed 
to acquire more than 64 million hectares between 1964 and 1970. With the 
system favouring those who already have, and since there is no statutory 
limit to the size of individual holdings, the average size of these farms 
have not changed much with time* whereas they averaged 880 hectares in 
1968, they averaged, ten years later, 810 hectares." 
The A.F.C. is a statutory body established under the Agricultural 
Credit Act (Can. 323 Lews of Kenya) in 1963, and took over and combined 
the credit functions of the two Boards of Agriculture then serving the 
European and African areas as separate entities, lender the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation Act (No. 1 of 1969) the corporation was reconstituted 
with wider nowers and also took over the functions, assets and liabilities 
of the Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya. Under the new Act, A.F.C. provides 
both mortgage and development credit to lar^e as well as small-scale farmers. 
A F.C. is by far the largest single agricultural credit organisation in. 
Kenya, with assets in excess of 620 million shillings and a loan portfolio 
r T 
of 590 million shillings."''' From 197.3 to 1979, the total loan approvals 
amounted to 1,500 million shillings, about 20% of which was for small 
scale farmers and 34% to large scale ones. The credit policy favourable 
to those already possessing capital, and with a ceiling of 25,000 
shillings loan to the small-scale farmer, one cannot say that A.F.C. is 
promoting social equity. In fact, the whole exercise of acouisition of 
landed property from the .former European settlers has underlined and 
accentuated the disparities in land ownership as well as rural pauperism 
as wc- have just seen. State intervention has not only promoted social 
elivares in the agricultural sector, tbe industrial and commercial 
sectors have similarly been affected by the policy of 'Africanisation," 
though not as successfully. 
PH. II. °uhlic Frterpri.se in the Commercial and Tndustrial Sectors. 
'Je have already seen that the principle behind state participation 
in the Kenyan economy is that of "National Control without nationalisation 
in the legal sense. This means that in both the commercial and industrial 
sectors the avowed role of the State has been to promote private (African) 
enterprise. However, this task has not been without contradictions; State 
firms have often found themselves comnetin^ with African firms thus 
defeating the very purpose of their existence, and one wonders whether 
equity participation by public sector in Multinational companies enhances 
national control or entrenches fo?-"eign domination. These are the two 
factors that we have to take into account when dealing with the parastatals 
in both the commercial and industrial sectors. 
54. See Statistical Abstract 1979, p. 112. Note that 75"- of farms in 
Kenya cover less than ? hectares, with 32° less than one hectare, and that 
90% of the population live in rural areas. 
55. 1979 figures. See A.F.C. brochure (undated). 
56. Ibid. 
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I. Parastatals and the Commercial Sector. 
After the initial onslaught on the foreign domination of the 
agricultural sector, the next target was obviously the commercial one. 
Here the predominance of the Asian community was net and since the 
majority till clung to their British nationality, their case was 
relatively easier to deal with, as was demonstrated by the passing of 
the Trade Licencing Act of 1967, which forbids non-citizens from trading 
in rural areas and certain zones of big cities and restricts them to 
certain commodities. 
What was soon realised, however, was that the Africans had no capital, 
either to start business, or to take over from those affected bv the new law. 
The credit system still functioned on racist lines, with the banking sector 
57 
still under foreign monopoly. It was at this juncture that the State 
created new financial institutions, and reorganised existing ones to 
facilitate access to credit by the Nationals. Thus the Kenya Commercial 
Bank soon appeared, followed by the National Bank of Kenya, whilst the 
Industrial Development Corporation was restructured to become Industrial 
and Commercial Development Corporation. These three .institutions were to 
become the corner-stone of the new policy, with the I.C.D.C. spearheading 
the promotion of small enterprise and commercial ventures. I.C.D.C. was 
also to become the instrument of government equity investment in joint 
ventures, most of which are of foreign origin. I.C.D.C.'s involvement in 
commercial activities is twofold- on the one hand it runs its own 
commercial enterprises (Kenya National Trading Corporation and KENATCO, 
for example), whilst on the other hand it has been running a loan scheme 
for small-scale businessmen ('small loan scheme ). Of the former, K.N.T.C. 
has been engaged in wholesale business and KENATCO has been 
involved in transport, both long haulare and passanger. 
A K.N.T.C. and Trade. 
Kenya National Trading Corporation was established in 1965, as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the I.C.D.C. K.N.T.C. is a wholesale company, '-
and its inception was part of the strategy to africanise both wholesale 
and retail trade. By initially dealing in basic consumer commodities 
as a mononolv, the State not only wanted to ensure the regular availa-
57. In 1967, four years after independence, the government established 
that of all the loans and credit accorded by the commercial banks in the 
country, only 2.6°- went to African businessmen and firms. See Central Bank 
of Kenya Annual Report June 1973, and JOPOENSEN, J. Multinational Corporations 
and the Indigenisation of Kenyan Economy", in WIDSTRAND, C., (ed). Multi-
national Firms in Africa. Unpsala- Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 
1975. 
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bility of these foods 3 it also acted as the na^or surlier to the new 
African traders, ensuring their viability in this highly competitive 
sector. The Trading Act of 1967 come as a reinforcement to this policy, 
enlarging the clientele of the K.N T.C. 
The Corporation has greatly expanded since its inception- starting 
with 35 distributing agents in 1965, it had more than 3,000 in 1978, with 
a record turnover of 1.2 5 billion' shillings in 1977 of which 11 million was 
in the form of profit. A+ the same time the Corporation had established 
depots in at least 30 district headquarters (out of a total of 41), having 
started with onlv Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. 
The efforts to africanise trade (both wholesale and retail) have 
not been as successful in large agglomerations as in the rural areas. 
Shoos that were ''taken over" bv Africans have mysteriously gone back to 
their original owners or kin (the Biashara Street shops in Nairobi are the 
classic example): apparently the African owners have leased them or sole 
their licences to these people for commissions etc. To thwart this 
practice in wholesale trade, the K.N T.C.: has introduced a system of 
compulsory yearly renewal of licence for its agents. 
Although the K.N.T.C. as a State Training Corporation should have 
been involved in import/export right from the early days, it did not 
contemplate this until 1^77. One would have expected the Corporation to 
participate in this sector is two ways: first to promote trade with 
Socialist States, since these countries would rather deal with State 
agencies whose activities are not basically motivated by private profit 
or gain. Secondl''. the K. ;.T.C should have been helping the Africans 
break the monopoly of this trade by Asian merchants. 
Regardinr trade with the Socialist countries, this seems to be the 
last of the priorities o-! the government since the figures speak for 
themselves- in 1978 for example, out of a total 395.7 million pounds (K) 
worth of exports, only 6.9 million pounds worth went to those countries. 
The import figures were even more telling - £5.3 million as opposed to 
£661.1 million of global imp orts As for the African penetration of the 
import /export market, this has not been possible for two major reasons: 
supplv contacts overseas and Bank credit facilities. These we?.Tcnesses 
have been identified by the K.N.T.C. and time will tell whether any serious 
efforts have been undertaken by the State Corporation to rectify them as in 
the case with wholesale trade. 
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3. KENTATC0 AND TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
Ker.atco is one o-f the very rare Parastatals that operate in a sector 
in direct corr-eti.ticn with the Nationals (the other we can easily single 
out is the Kenya Meat Commission K.M.C ), though historically this is 
explicable. The company was originally a co-operative (Kenya National 
Transport Co-operative Society Limited) that was founded bv a grouo of 
owner - operated taxi proprietors who decided to venture into the transport 
industry in the early 60's. By 1966, the comoany was confronted with 
problems-after experiencing considerable expansion - due to lack of 
essential back-up services, technical know-how, financial advice and 
competent management and was faced with liquidation by its creditors. 
After annealing to the Head of State, the government intervened to save the 
society, and through the I.C.D.C took over Kenatco with the Co-operative 
society retaining a token share. By 1981, the societv had been liquidated 
and its share bought out by the I.C.D.C. 
The taking over of Kenatco in the late sixties coincided with the 
revised law on transport (Transport Licensing Act, 1968), whose enactment 
meant africanisation of the road transport industry, hitherto dominated 
by Asian and European firms, Long distance passenger transport (by buses) 
that the new company had inherited from the Co-operative had to be abandoned 
due to fierce competition from private firms. So Kenatco concentrated on 
long haulage and taxi operations. 
In recent years the comoanv has been experiencing problems, which 
have reflected on its financial performance. The origins of these problems 
are twofold' first, its haulage business is directly linked to the geo-
politics of the region, since tbe trucks have been operating as far as 
Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire and southern Sudan. The closure of 
the Tanzanian border in 1977 adversely affected Kenatco's performance, as 
the bulk of its business was with Zambia.50 This forced the company to 
concentrate on. the northern route (i.e. Uganda, Rwanda etc). ™hich was 
already well served by private hauliers. So the regional political 
stability is a condition for Kenatco s commercial viability. 
Another source of problems is the fact that Kenatco's taxis operate 
in a highly competitive market and is nrone to the same problems as any 
state enterprise th?t does not enjoy monopoly in its sector. Attempts to 
monopolise the transportation of delerates to the I.M.F. conference in 1973 
met with fierce opposition from private taxi operators and the government 
was forced to give UP idea. More recently, in April 1980, private taxi 
operators in, Mombasa forced the government to let them operate from Mombasa 
airport which had been exclusively served bv Kenatco. 
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From what we have discussed above, it seems that a State enterprise 
that operates in a competitive sector which is already well africanised1'' 
defeats the whole nurpose of its existence of generating resources for 
the State, it becomes instead a liability and a burden to rate payers. 
The problem of competition is not only confined to the State 
enterprise and African enterprise. The latter have been facing stiff 
competition from private Kenyan (but non-African) and non-Kenyan firms .. 
have the State backing (through various narastatals) a policy that at most 
can be described as ambivalent. Although the State has been backing 
indigenous industrialists and businessmen through financial and technical 
assistance, its involvement in ventures with foreign firms (especially the 
so-called Multinationals) has been the object of criticism from various 
quarters. 
11. Parastatals and Indig.ineous Enterprise 
In this section, we shall consider the role of the Parastatals 
involved in the major industries of the country, i.e. construction 
and manufacturing. In the building and construction industry, the 
National Construction Corporation (N.C.C.) is supposed to aid upcoming -
.-frican constructors, whilst in the manufacturing it is the I.C.D.C. and 
its affiliates that have been allocated the task of Dromoting indigenous 
enterprise. 
A . N .C . .->nd the Construction Industry. 
In 1972, the I .-L0, made the following remark on the construction 
industry in Kenya-
'The structure of this industry shows the familiar three-tier 
pattern of the Kenyan economy, with a few large European contractors 
dominating the large civil engineering projects, and large non-residential 
building contracts to a lesser extent the Asian firms mainly with an annual 
turnover between £10,000 and £400,000, mostly in building- and the African 
contractors spanning the wnole range from the two largest, employing 
700-800 workers at the moment, down to the one-man self-employed artisan. 
In spite of the commendable efforts bv the National Construction Corporation, 
the participation of Africans in housing and construction activities 
59 remains very limited" 
59. Employment, Incomes und Equality- a ctrat;gy for Increasing Productive 
Employment in Kenya. International Labour Office: Geneva 1972, p. 197. 
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This observation is still true ten vears later. As tbe Chairman 
of the National Association of African Cbnstructors recently remarked, "more 
than o^ contracts in the building industry go to non-Kenyans' ^  W e 
assume this percentage to be in value terms, then the amount involved is 
considerable, taking into consideration the share of building industry in 
capital formation (25% in 1977, i.e. 1.9 bullion shillings out of 7.8 billion) 
The task of correcting this discrepancy has been confined to the 
N.C.C., which provides financial and technical assistance to tbe indigenous 
enterpreneurs. The Corporation was created in 1967 when it appeared that 
the Nationals were experiencing problems resulting from lack of capital and 
credit facilities for the acnuisition of materials, equipment and transport. 
At first a limited liability company, its statutes were transformed by an 
Act of Parliament in September 197? and it become a Public Corporation under 
the Ministry of Works. 
By 1979, out of 850 African constructors who had been registered with 
the Corporation since its inception, 450 were still active. This means that 
these companies had been winding up at the rate of about forty per year. 
This rate oc bankruptcy has transformed tbe N.C.C. into a#veritable financial 
burden for the State By June 1978, the N.C.C. had accumulated losses uoto 
30.6 million shillings out of the 57.6 million the government had pumped 
62 
into its coffers since 1967 In 1978-79, the government accorded the 
Corporation some .75 million shillings to keep it afloat, proof that the 
state still believed in the importance of its mission. 
In fact, without State support, African enterprise in this vital 
industry would have virtually collapsed.. Apart from the technical and __ ^ 
financial support through the N.C.C., the government had directed that 
constructions carried out by its various departments whose estimated costs 
did not pass a certain amount were automatically accorded to African 
constructors. Originally limited to ?O0,n00 shillings, this ceiling was 
6 3 raised to 4 million shillings bv a Presidential directive in 1980. 
60. See The Standard, May 19, 1980, By ''non-Kenyans' we assume he means 
non-Africans''. 
61. The Statistical Abstract 1978, p. 49. 
62. This included 6 3 million shillings of bad debts. See the Weekly 
Review, June 13, 1980 
63. Ibid. 
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This decision, and the -Fact the 450 enterprises supported by the N.C.C. 
were in 1979 enraged in projects valued at 100 million shillings (i.e. an 
average of .2 million per project) is proof that african enterprise can 
develop if actively supported by the State. In terms of employment, the 
'+50 firms had a labour force of some 4,000 people the same year. If the 
building industry accounted for 31,000 'employed (1977 figures), the African 
enterprises employed more than their share in the national share of profits 
(12* v. 6%). 
B, I .C P.O.: Tor African enterprise or Multinationals ? 
It is through the small loans scheme that the I.C.D.C. has been 
promoting small-scale enterprise (both commercial and industrial). Under 
this scheme short-term loans (5-8 years) are available to businessmen, 
with the sum varying from 10,000 to 750,000 shillings maximum. In 1976, 
ten years after tbe sceme started, these credits accounted for the majority 
(53%) of the net assets of tbe I.C.D.C. Bv then, the latter had accorded 
more than 300 loans (70% of which were commercial) totalising some-224.7 
million shillings. By 1978, the trend had altered considerably this sum 
totalised 252.4 million against net assets o^ 583.7 million (i.e. 40%). 
The rest wore in the form of shares in various companies, the bulk of which 
are multinational. 
The workings of thi small loans scheme and its weaknesses 
64 have been adequately analysed. Between 1967 and 1976, verv few 
enterprises were initiated ex nililo, most of them having been bought from 
expatriates. Besides, the new ones were relatively simple. For example 
out • of a sample of 237 I.e.B.C. assisted projects, Mwaniki discovered 
that the ratio acouired enterprise/n^w enterprise varied from O'll for 
65 posho mills to 6-0 for printing works. ' After the I.C.D.C. had 
64. See mainly MWA*TIKI, N., Public "ol.icy and Political Development. 
The Impact o f the Implementation of the Afri.canisation Policy though I.C • P.C •' s 
Suva 11 Industrial Loans Scheme 1^61-1973 t.I>.S Worfcing Paber Nc. 295, 1977~ 
65. Ibid. p. 33. 
- 35 - IDSAP 390 
identifical the sources of had "performance of tht; uo-cominp entrepreneurs, 
the Corporation initiated a new type of scheme under the Kenya Industrial 
Estates (K.I.E.) programme. Thr- K.I.E. can he described ••"' 
as the embryo of the indigenous small and middle scale industry. 
The nolicy of the K.I.E. has been to create small production units 
into in 'mini-industrial zones" in various centres throughout the Republic. 
These units are divided into three categories, depending on their location: 
in big towns they are called Industrial Estates., in smaller towns they are 
known as Rural Industrial Development Centres (R.I.D.C ), whilst for the 
rural areas are proposed Industrial Promotion Areas (I.P.A.). 
Of all these structures, it is the industrial Estates that constitute 
the most complex units: a K.I.E. industrial estate comprises of an 
administrative bl#ek s industrial premises plus a technical assistance 
centre. The R.ID.C. would normal]v consist of an administrative block and 
workshops, but much simpler than a K.I.E., i.e. it would engage in 
furniture making, metalwork, woodwork etc. for trai.ning craftmen. 
The credit policy of K.I.F. i.s simple for projects involving 
less than 3 million shillings the organization provides a maximum of 
35% of capital, whereas for those costing more than 3 million shillings 
it provides 80% of the capital. The machines and equipment are usually 
1009- financed. 
As table Mo. 4 indicates, K.I.E. invested more than 83 million 
shillings in various projects between 1967 and 1973. The pattern of 
these investments shows that the towns had a lion's share, with Nairobi 
itself claiming more than 50^ of total investments, although it accounted 
for onlv 28% of the projects. 
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previous ten years, spending 340.8 million shillings in 
five years.65 
Like most development agencies, the K.I.E. is a 
great liability to the State. To balance its recurrent 
expenditure, the governnent is constantly obliged to subsidise 
the organisation. In 1977, the expenditure was four times 
greater than income (12.1 million shillings against 3.1 million), 
and 1978 balance sheets shows the same tendency: 14.5 million 
6 7 shillings foe expenditure against 5.3 million income. 
The greatest obstacle to the advancement of the 
indigenous entrepreneus is the already existing enterprise which 
more often than not is controlled by non-citizen. In fact it 
seems paradoxical for the State to use the same organisation 
(I.C.D.C.) to finarce indigenous enterprise and at the same time 
acquire shares in foreign firms. 
C. Joint Ventures: Partner or Appendix of Foreign 
Capital9 
By 1973, the amount of share-capital in private 
companies had surpassed that invested in the form of small 
industrial loans to the National entrepreneurs. The greatest 
part of these shares (241.3 million shillings or 73% was in 
the firms the I.C.D.C. had minority share participation 
(See Table No.5). 
Type of Participation No.of Firms Share Capital Dividends in 
(in millions millions (1978) 
of Sh) 
Minority 46 241.3 24.6 
Majority 10 80.1 7.5 
Wholly owned subsidiary 6 9.9 1.0 
TOTAL _ _ 62 331 .3 33. 1 
66. K.I.E. Limited. Arrual Report 1977-78,p . 4 
67. Ibid, p.30. To improve its efficiency, the K.I.E. was 
transformed early i?78 into a "inancial institution "to promote 
small industries throughout the Republic". At the same time it 
became autonomous from the I.C.D.C. 
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Table No. 6: The Fattern of ".C.D.C. Participation 1 r 
Multinational Firms in 1978. 
"..,.) the foreign investor rarely engages in a 
joint project by missionary virtue. (He does this) because the 
country in which he wishes to invest exerts sufficient pressure 
on him ( to do so) or because he believes that this association 
will procure him an advantage he would never have obtained 
(or quickly obtained) if he had chosen ar investment in a wholly 
owned subsidiary".68 
In the case of the I.C.D.C., ss Leys observed, when it 
wanted to venture into sectors it was not experienced in or on 
the other hand, when foreign investors were confident of 
profitability under the cover of the existing Foreign Investments 
Frotection Ate) (of 19G7), they preferred to forgo State 
participation. According to Leys, it seems that in, the majority 
of the cases it was the foreign investor who requested State 
participation and not the other way round. 
i i 
As tables 5 and 6 shows, the greater part of I.C.D.Cs 
dividends seem to emanate from the Multinational subsidiaries. 
Although this could be perceived as a source of finance by the 
I.C.D.C. (and the government), lack of effective control-bcth 
at financial and nanagerial levels - make it 'difficult to offset 
this with the possible losses the country incurs due to the 
siphoning of money through such loopholes as overinvoicing, , 
payment of fictitions or dubious managerial and consultancy 
fees etc. 
In the case of the Industrial Development Bank (I.D.B.) 
an I.C.D.C. subdiary, the State even prohibits it from taking 
more than 50% equity, although it is through the I.D.B. that the 
government makes the heaviest joint venture investments. For 
example the bank invests only in projects involving at least 
one million shillings and cannot lend less than 4 million 
68. BE C'-U IN , J. P. Les Enterpri ses- i jn jointes International 
Dans les pays en voie de Dcvo-1 opmont^ Geneva: Institut 
Universi'taire de Hautes Etudes Internationales-, 1972,p. 79. -
69. LEYS, C. op.cit., p. 133 
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70 Shillings. Besides, it is through this bank that the state 
receives the bulk of multilateral aid to provide industrialists 
71 with their foreign exchange requirements. By the end of 
1978, i.e. fivo years after its inception, the bank had 
invested a total of 419.4 million shillings in 59 projects. 
Out of this amount, 331.^million (79%) was in the form of 
crodit, the remainder ir, the form of equity in 35 companies 
72 including multinational firms. 
The question that arises is how to reconcile the 
apparent contradiction between the policy of promoting local 
enterprise and at the same time actively and positively aiding 
foreign enterprise. Certain scholars see in this an element 
73 
in the perpetuation of neo-colonial domination. and the 
"bourgeoisie" that would emanate from this policy would be an 
ally to international capital. What the protagonists of this 
deterministic and unific view of the Kenyan "bourgeoisie" tend 
to ignore is the socio-political dynamism that is characteristic 
of the Kenyan society in recent years. First of all, not 
all the indigenous entrepreneurs regard kindly the economic 
policy favouring State participation in foreign firms. As 74 
Jorgensen's study revealed as early as 1975 whilst some 
wished for a more active State participation (at management 
level) in these firms, others were hostile because these firms 
compoted vit.h their own. The more prosperous ones wanted the 
70. See Industrial Development Bank Limited. Annual Report 
and Accounts 1979. I.D.B. is a limited liability company 
created by the government and the I.C.D.C. in 1973, and is a 
purely developm<nt hank (i.e. does not invest ir purely 
commercial, agricultural ond real estate activities). 
71. By December 1978, such debts accounted to 133.3million 
shillings (or 33':- of the company's assets), out of which 91million 
were owed to the 'v'orld Bank alone. Ibid. In 1980 the bank 
received a further loan of 30 million dollars for the period 
1980-1983. 
72. These were (equity % and value in shillings): Booth 
Manufacturing Africa (78.7%, 3 million); Associated Vehicle 
Assemblers (Lonrho and Inchcape, 25.1% 3.6 million); Metal Box 
Company (5.1%, 2 millions.) 
73. LEYS C., op . ci t. Nowrojee, P. "Public Enterprise in 
Kenya" , in GHAI, Y.ed. Lav; in the Political Economy of Public 
Enterprise: African Perspectives Upp SALA S.I.A.S. , 1977 





Although the f-.o'.'ernment tried to take measures to 
promote participation by the Mat i or ale in fore igr-owned firms, 
thin, had only beer. dor.* b> he. 1 f-mcasures. For example the 
Transport Licencing fcoard threatened ( in tho early 70's) not 
to rovit-w licences for those firms which did not sell at least 
of their nominal capital to ciiizcrs, an operatior that 
revealed the fundamental weakness of the indigenous people: 
lr.ck of liquidity. This "lean? that, the lion's share in those 
transactions went t:> citizens of non-Af ri car. origin, mostly 
Asians. ~ It is Kith this orjb'.em in mind that the I.C.D.C. 
created - subsidiary, the I.C.D.C. Investment Company Limited, 
with che sole aim of acquiring shares is existing industries 
for itfj chare-holder.?., especially or. the Nairobi stock market. 
Thio company has expanded considerably since its 
formation in 1967. Starting with a nominol capital 2 million 
shillings, this reac^cd million in 1974. by 1978 this share 
capital had arisen t > "'0 nl .1 • •} on shi J1 Lng.s , and its last 
ommisrion 1978 r.versubscriir-id. Although tho Company is 
expand.irj, the r.0.D.C's shnve is decreasing progressively, 
having dropped f «om to .! '•';> between 197/3 and 19 78, During 
the :-;am> period, ir veutmontr quadruple d, from lr: .7 million 
shillings to almor-'t 7q million, in 31 compani':. r . Profits 
from those l • ;etr< c followed the same trend, from '-.5 iil. lion 
shillings in 1974 to 5.9 million in 1 "578 . The number of share-
holders a..ipmcn':ed considerably ir recent years, from 3,000 to 
14,000 betwe,.,-. 19':'4 and 1978. 
7hc ex or.-slop r " certain indigenous enterprises is 
oror-r that with solid ?t?to backing tho local entrepror-c-ous 
oa-, also brceV fh-' monopoly of foreign (or multinational) firms. 
A Lyp.'jrl example here is the Tiger shoe Company that has 
experienced considerable development. Initiated in 1970 as 
a K I.F., supported project, the company hag had to quit K.I.E. 
7 5 Sf.r : 7 L ;, Ch op.ci f •,,. 138 
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nrornif-.es to loin other firms ir Nairobi's .industrial area, and 
actually employs more than 200 people, producing more than 
100,000 shoes annually (1078 figures), and earned 16.6 million 
shillings on 1978. This expansion has been to the detriment 
of the Bata Company."'' 
The foregoing demonstrates the importance of the 
control of State apparatus, the stake being tne control of the 
decision centre regarding economic policy. This partly explains 
what seems to bo perpetual factional struggle in Kenya politics. 
The actors represent various social strata that have emerged 
as e result of the economic policy entrenched by the Sessional 
Papor Ho. 10 of 1965. 
Ir the absence of a multi-party system where these 
strata would be politically represented and ideologically 
Identified, various platforms of political expression have 
enagod. These range ^orn vocal populists ("dissidents"), whose 
themes (fair distribution of property etc) can be said to 
echo th< aspiration:: of the masses, through ethr: cally-based 
associations whoso interests did not preclude State control 
(Cema, for example ), to coalitions and openly opposed to any 
changes in the economic policy, therefore opposed to the first 
two. Hon.ce the seemingly perpetual factional struggles in the 
nulling party, KANIJ. 
CO'-: 'I 1 ' 10,1: ,rH 1V _STTIC A:.'!) CLASS •'OR-.. 1IQM-
7 have observe ! that public ei terprise is the direct 
product of th< State and it is therefore important to conclude 
on this, to und rstand tin hi -tonical consvquinces of State 
participation in the < coi-cny in ' in ger.eral and in Kenya 
particul.~rlv . 
76. So* nr aspcc'. o^ the story ir S'*M.INSC.i. 1 The Rise 
of a National Bourgeoisie ir l<v r.vn in . A.r .L . "o. c Jan. 




The importance of the State is underlined by two 
factors. First of all, if it is true that the State always 
intervenes in the economy, the question that arises with the 
public enterprise ir to understand why and "now the State 
utilises .lis particular node of intervention. In the case 
o* Kenya ( and other .African countries), the underlying factor 
is to create a national base for development. 
In the second place the State is neither an abstraction 
nor a neutral entity: it is a politico-economic apparatus 
contnolled and manipulated by certain socio-economic groups. 
In this manner public enterprise can be utilised to promote 
the interests of those groups that dominate the State apparatus, 
and to consolidate capitalism. In the ''Third 7orld" countries 
in particular, the State can ^ind itself influencing the formation 
of social classes and interest groups. 
Various studies have emerged on class interest and the 
manipulation of public enterprise in Africa. In his study of 
the Tanzania situation, Shivji claims that public enterprise 
was conceived in order to break the economic power of the 
Asians and other groups, and then used by the local "bourgeoisie" 
to impose themselves an other social groups (petty bourgeoisie, 
77 workers ard peasants). 
In their study on the role of the State in the Ivory 
Coast IKONIKOFF and SIGAI. have Introduced the concept of "Relay 
7 8 State" ("L'Etat Relai"). The fact that the (Ivorian) State 
77. shivji ,i. Class Struggle in Tanzania. Dar-cs-Salaam, 
London: Tanzania Publishing House, Heinenann, 1975. This thesis 
is reductionist and questionable for two reasons: first, public 
enterprise (established for ideological reasons after the 
Arusha Declaration) has been used by bureaucrats to promote its 
interests and privileges. Secondly, commercial and industrial 
immigrant groups in Tanzania v.ere far less important than was 
the case in Kenya. 
78. INONIKOFF, M, SECAL.S. 'L.Etat Relais': Un Modele 
de Development des Societes Foripheriquos? Le cas de La cote 
d1 I voire", in Revue Tiers Monde, Vol. XIX No. 76, Oct-Dec. 1978. 
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intends to retrocede public enterpriser, to the Nationals gives 
the African State a historic mission of developing social 
classes. 
"The State is only conceived as a "relay authority" 
having to transmit these functions to a social stratur. which 
could bo called "National Bourgeoisie", whose creation would 
7Q be (the duty) of this very State". 
In the case of Kenya, we have seen the part played by 
the public enterprise in promoting rural commercial and 
industrial "bourgeoisies". Public Enterprise, as State 
instrument, is playing a decisive role in this historical proces 
"Ibid", p. 701. 
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